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KATHRYN E. JOYCE 
 
 
Under the Direction of Christie J. Hartley 
 
ABSTRACT 
 In this thesis I argue that Adam Smith is committed to moral egalitarianism, 
which extends to his theory of political economy. While Smith’s work is often used to 
justify economic inequality in society, I show that his political theory is best understood 
as a kind of relational egalitarianism. Using Elizabeth Anderson’s Democratic Equality 
as a model, I examine Smith’s commitment to equality in the space of social 
relationships. In particular, I argue that Smith’s focus on eliminating inequalities that 
cause oppression in society in conjunction with his efforts to design a political and 
economic system that will yield social conditions of freedom for individuals make him a 
relational egalitarian.  
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 Although Adam Smith is known as the father of capitalism and his work is often 
used to justify economic inequality in society, in this thesis, I will argue that Smith’s 
political theory is best understood as a kind of relational egalitarianism. Recent Smith 
scholarship has increasingly turned to examine how Smith’s moral theory can ground a 
liberal political theory by highlighting egalitarian themes within Smith’s moral view that 
undergird his political commitments.1 These scholars provide compelling evidence to 
support the view that Smith considers every individual to have equal moral standing, but 
little has been said about the type of egalitarianism found in Smith’s theory of political 
economy.    
 Smith’s egalitarianism is distinctive. He does not advocate for the equal distribution 
of material goods or favor economic equality as some egalitarians do. Instead he calls for 
both recognizing others as morally equal and awarding admiration unequally, based on the 
virtue of one’s character and conduct. Smith’s view of social rank and the widespread 
material inequality found in Smith’s commercial system also appear to conflict with many 
versions of egalitarianism. For these reasons, any viable egalitarian interpretation will have 
to be explicit about the type of egalitarianism found in Smith’s work.  
  In constructing his egalitarian interpretation of Smith, Samuel Fleischacker 
attributes to him a “strong moral egalitarianism.” Fleischacker’s description of the kind of 
equality he finds in Smith is vague; he describes it as “some sort of fundamental equality in 
worth” which underlies Smith’s normative claim that individuals ought to be regarded as 
equals (Fleischacker 2004, 74). Fleischacker also says that “Smith appears to have been 
                                                 
1 See Darwall (1999, 2001), Fleischacker (2004), Griswold (1999), Weinstein (2006).  
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committed to a remarkably strong version of the claim that people are essentially equal in 
abilities” (Fleischacker 2004, 76).  
 Most notable among the critics of an egalitarian interpretation of Smith is D.D. 
Raphael, who argues in response to Fleischacker that “Smith does not espouse 
egalitarianism proper” (Raphael 2007, 123).  By “egalitarianism proper” Raphael seems to 
be referring to a strong, comprehensive view of equality that covers a wide range of human 
characteristics and political values. For example, Raphael points out that Smith evaluates 
the life of a soldier as superior to the life of a monk. According to Raphael, if Smith were an 
egalitarian he would view these two lives equally (Raphael 2007, 123). In opposition, I 
argue that Smith assesses the life of the solider as superior in terms of virtue; this is 
consistent with a relational egalitarian view.  
 Raphael also argues against Fleischacker that “it cannot be true that Smith was 
‘committed to a remarkably strong’ form of egalitarianism” because Smith does not deny 
the existence of natural differences or argue that individuals have equal talents and abilities 
(Raphael 2007, 123). I agree with Raphael that Smith acknowledges natural differences in 
talent and ability, but I will show that Smith still expresses a strong commitment to moral 
egalitarianism because he argues that these differences are not morally important. Rather, 
individuals are equal in terms of moral worth. Raphael rejects the view that Smith 
recognizes individuals as having equal moral worth; he points to several passages that 
seem to dispute such an interpretation. Raphael argues further that if Smith was a moral 
egalitarian, then evidence of this view should appear in Smith’s primary ethical work, The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, which, he claims, it does not (Raphael 2007, 122).  
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 I will argue that these criticisms stem from a misunderstanding of Smith’s 
egalitarian commitments. Certainly, Fleischacker’s failure to be clear about what he means 
by ‘egalitarianism’ invites severe criticism. However, for my purposes, egalitarianism can 
be understood as the view that justice requires that individuals be treated equally with 
respect to certain factors that pervasively affect an individual’s life. The ultimate basis for 
this view is the claim that all persons have equal moral worth.2 Egalitarianism, as such, 
does not require that those individuals that count as persons have all the same abilities; it 
also does not require that individuals be made equal in terms of material goods. Indeed, 
egalitarians disagree over the respect(s) in which individuals should be equal.  
 In order to make the argument that Smith is an egalitarian, I will examine the nature 
of Smith’s commitment to equality. I will argue that i) Smith is committed to moral 
equality—the view that human beings share equal moral standing based on their equal 
worth, and that ii) Smith’s political theory grows out of his commitment to moral equality,3 
and properly interpreted, is a relational egalitarian theory.  Relational egalitarianism is 
distinct from other forms of egalitarianism because of its central claim that what is 
important is equality in those matters that affect the social relations in which individuals 
stand, rather than equality as such. Elizabeth Anderson provides an especially clear account 
of relational egalitarianism; I will therefore examine Smith’s political view in light of 
Anderson’s model of equality as a social relationship to reveal Smith’s commitment to 
relational egalitarianism. Interpreting Smith this way best captures Smith’s commitment to 
                                                 
2 See Arneson (2009) and Anderson (1999).  
3 See Haakonssen (1988) 
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equality and avoids apparent problems with an egalitarian interpretation, including those 
posed by Raphael.   
 To begin, I will briefly describe relational egalitarianism, using Anderson’s view as a 
paradigmatic example. Next I examine Smith’s moral theory in order to show that he is 
committed to moral equality. Then I argue that certain fundamental commitments of his 
political theory are the same commitments held by relational egalitarians. Although I 
consider particular passages that appear to conflict with my egalitarian interpretation of 
Smith, I argue that understanding Smith’s egalitarianism as relational assuages these 
concerns.  
 
II. Anderson’s Relational Egalitarianism: Democratic Equality 
 Relational egalitarianism is the view that justice requires eliminating the kinds of 
inequality that allow for oppression and domination. Andrew Altman and Christopher 
Heath Wellman explain,  
 …the kinds of inequality that are of greatest moral concern are those that involve 
 an asymmetry that empowers the better-offs to systematically treat the worse-offs in 
 ways that seriously wrong them.  The wrong is variously identified as oppression or 
 domination.  In whatever way one thinks that the wrong is best explained, the key 
 point is that the focus of moral concern should not be on inequality as such but 
 rather on what the wealthy or the politically powerful or the socially privileged can 
 do, with impunity, to those below them.  And what the better-offs can do to those 
 below them is a function of the kind of relationship in which they find themselves 
 (Altman & Wellman 2009, 132).   
 
On this view, not all inequalities are morally important because not all inequalities cause 
members of society to be vulnerable to oppression. Relational egalitarians are concerned 
about equality among those who interact and form relationships. Equality between societies 
that have no contact is not as morally important as equality among members of a society.  
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 Anderson’s democratic equality is a relational theory of equality which requires that 
individuals have equal standing with fellow members of society so that they can make 
claims on others, have their interests receive equal consideration, have their rights 
respected, and have the ability to fully participate in civil society (Anderson 2009, 219). She 
argues that the proper negative aim of egalitarian justice is to end oppression, which is 
socially imposed. The proper positive aim is to “create a community in which people stand 
in relations of equality to others” (Anderson 1999, 289). Anderson claims that members of 
society must recognize one another as equal and hold one another mutually accountable for 
abiding by principles that secure conditions of freedom for all. 
 Rather than accepting the view that equality and freedom are conflicting ideals, 
Anderson emphasizes the connection between equality and freedom (Anderson 1999, 315). 4 
She explains that oppression negates freedom, while standing in relations of equality with 
others allows individuals to act freely:  
 Equals are not subject to arbitrary violence or physical coercion by others.  Choice  
 unconstrained by arbitrary physical coercion is one of the fundamental conditions 
 of freedom. Equals are not marginalized by others. They are therefore free to 
 participate in politics and the major institutions of civil society. Equals are not 
 dominated by others; they do not live at the mercy of others’ wills. This means that 
 they govern their lives by their own wills, which is freedom.  Equals are not 
 exploited by others. This means they are free to secure the fair value of their labor 
 (Anderson 1999, 315).  
Anderson agrees with Amartya Sen that capabilities ought to be the proper metric of justice. 
Living, for Sen, is an aggregate of functionings, understood as the things that an individual 
can be or do (Sen 1992, 39-40).  Capabilities consist of the set of functionings that a person 
can achieve with the resources available to her. The capabilities set one has reflects her 
                                                 
4 Anderson rejects the libertarian notion that freedom is lack of interference or obstruction because, as she 
says, “this definition of freedom neglects the importance of having the means to do what one wants” 
(Anderson 1999, 315).  
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freedom to lead one kind of life or another (Sen 1992, 46). Anderson argues that 
“negatively, people are entitled to whatever capabilities are necessary to enable them to 
avoid or escape entanglement in oppressive social relations” and “positively, they are 
entitled to capabilities necessary for functioning as an equal citizen in a democratic state” 
(Anderson 1999, 316). 
 In particular, Anderson claims that individuals must be capable of functioning as  i) 
a dignified human being, ii) a citizen of a democratic state, and iii) a participant in a system 
of cooperative production (Anderson 1999, 318). The capability to function as a human 
being requires effective access to the goods required for physical survival, along with access 
to the basic conditions of human agency (Anderson 1999, 318). To be capable of functioning 
as equal citizens, individuals need “effective access to the goods and relationships of civil 
society” (Anderson 1999, 318). Anderson specifies that members of society need to be 
capable of functioning as a citizen in a democratic state because democratic arrangements 
facilitate collective self-determination (Anderson 1999, 313).  Functioning as an equal citizen 
also requires social conditions in which persons are accepted by others and can “appear in 
public without shame”5 (Anderson 1999, 318). Anderson emphasizes the importance of 
institutions that recognize individuals as equals in all of their diversity and are organized 
so that the “diversity of people’s talents, aspirations, roles, and cultures” can benefit all 
members of society (Anderson 1999, 308).   
 Anderson views the economy as a system of cooperative production in which 
contributions at all levels should be appreciated within relationships of equal respect rather 
                                                 
5 Pogge points out that Smith is the first to recognize the ability to appear in public without shame is a 
necessary part of individual liberty. See Pogge (2010).  
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than a system that empowers some to exploit others. She argues that egalitarians ought to 
be concerned with the “relationships within which goods are distributed” rather than the 
pattern of distribution itself (Anderson 1999, 314). Anderson explains,  
 …democratic equality is sensitive to the need to integrate the demands of equal 
 recognition with those of equal distribution. Goods must be distributed according 
 to principles and processes that express respect for all. People must not be required 
to  grovel or demean themselves before others as a condition of laying claim to their 
share  of goods. The basis for people’s claims to distributed goods is that they  are 
equals,  not inferiors, to others (Anderson 1999, 314).6 
  
Similarly, the division of labor should be regarded as a comprehensive, efficient system in 
which contributions at every level are recognized as necessary components. Those holding 
low-skill positions ought to be valued for relieving others from having to perform these 
tasks, which allows them to make more productive use of their talents. Also, individuals 
must have the freedom to choose their occupation and careers must be open to talents. On 
this view, material inequalities that grow out of the economic system are not problematic, 
as long as “all citizens enjoy a decent set of freedoms, sufficient for functioning as an equal 
in society” (Anderson 1999, 326).  
 While Anderson’s view carries a strong endorsement of democracy, democracy is a 
feature particular to her model and is not a necessary component of all relational egalitarian 
theories. Anderson is concerned primarily with a society in which rules of justice and 
public policy are acceptable to all members, regarded as equals; she argues that a 
democratic government insofar as it is a “manifestation of democratic culture” provides the 
best means for ensuring that everyone who is subject to a set of laws and policies within a 
                                                 
6 As Pogge points, the idea that people should not have to depend on the benevolence of others or 
“grovel and demean themselves” in order to secure their share of goods comes from Smith’s WN. See 
Pogge (2010).  
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society is given equal consideration in their construction (Anderson 2009, 214; 1999, 314-16). 
Anderson recommends democracy as the best approach for fostering social conditions of 
equality in society, but this implementation strategy is independent of the relational 
egalitarian-making features of her view.  
 In review, relational egalitarians don’t consider equal outcomes as such valuable, 
and they do not identify all persons as being the same in terms of talents or abilities. Rather, 
they promote arrangements in which all individuals are able to function as equals, 
regardless of natural talents. Relational equality is concerned with distribution of divisible 
resources to the extent that individuals have enough to avoid oppression and function as 
equal members of society. Because relational egalitarians are concerned with relationships 
within a particular society, what resources are needed depends to some extent on social 
norms and individual circumstances.  
 
III. Smith’s Relational Egalitarianism  
 In this section I argue that Smith is best understood as a relational egalitarian. To 
show that Smith is best interpreted this way, I briefly explain his moral theory to reveal his 
commitment to moral equality. Then I turn to his political view in order to show that this 
commitment pervasively influences his political recommendations, through which he seeks 
to eliminate oppression and provide conditions of liberty for individuals.   
  
Smith’s Moral View 
Human Nature and Sympathy 
9 
 
 Smith begins The Theory of Moral Sentiments with the observation that humans are 
naturally social and interested in the well-being of others (TMS I.i.1.1). The social nature of 
human beings underlies Smith’s notion of sympathy, and extends throughout his account 
of moral psychology. Sympathy is commonly understood as a mere emotion. But Smith 
uses sympathy primarily to refer to “the means through which emotions are conveyed and 
understood” (Griswold 1999, 79).  Sympathy, in the Smithian sense, is a process7 by which 
spectators share in the experience of others through imagination and award moral approval 
to others’ sentiments and actions. Individuals are naturally motivated to sympathize 
because it is pleasurable and they desire the social relationships enabled by sympathy.8 
  To explain the process, a spectator witnesses an actor in a particular situation and 
observes her actions and emotional response to her situation. The spectator imagines herself 
as the actor in the actor’s place. She compares the sentiments depicted by the actions with 
the sentiments that she imagines that she, or anyone else, ought to feel if she were the actor 
in that particular situation. Smith says,  
 As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea 
 of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves 
 should  feel in the like situation…By the imagination we place ourselves in his 
situation, we  conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into 
his  body,  and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form 
some idea  of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is 
 not  altogether unlike them (TMS I.i.1.2).  
 
If, by imagining oneself as the actor in her situation and considering what she would 
properly feel, the spectator experiences the same sentiments as the actor, then the spectator 
                                                 
7 See Griswold (1999) 
8 For Smith, the process of sympathy itself is pleasurable, whether the sentiments shared are pleasant or 
unpleasant. Smith says, “the pleasure which we find in the conversation of one whom in all the passions 
of the heart we can entirely sympathize with, seems to do more than compensate the painfulness of that 
sorrow with which the view of his situation affects us” (TMS  I.1.2.6).  
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is said to sympathize. If the spectator’s sentiments are significantly different, then the 
spectator does not sympathize with the actor.  
 Sympathy underlies moral approval, and serves as the core of moral judgment. 
Smith explains,  
 When the original passions of the person principally concerned are in perfect 
 concord with the sympathetic emotions of the spectator, they necessarily appear to 
 this last just and proper, and suitable to their objects; and, on the contrary, when 
 upon bringing the case home to himself, he finds that they do not coincide with 
 what he feels, they necessarily appear to him unjust and improper, and unsuitable 
 to the causes which excite them. To approve of the passions of another, therefore, 
 as suitable to their objects, is the same thing as to observe that we entirely 
 sympathize with them (TMS I.i.3.1).  
If moral approval cannot be awarded, the spectator cannot be said to sympathize with the 
actor.9  Sentiments and the actions that they give rise to are evaluated separately. Whether 
an actor’s conduct can be deemed virtuous or vicious depends on “the cause which excited 
it, or the motive which gives occasion to it” and “the end which it proposes, or the effect 
which it tends to produce” (TMS I.i.3.5). A spectator can, through imagination, identify 
with the sentiments of the actor and consider them proper in accordance with the situation 
but disapprove of the actions taken by the actor in response to the situation. Take a case of 
revenge for example.  If a person is unjustly harmed by another, a spectator might identify 
with her feelings of resentment toward the offender, but condemn her vengeful response. 
To do so is to disapprove of her conduct.  
 Smith claims that everyone has the capacity to sympathize, but observes that certain 
things can make sympathy difficult. It is easiest for agents to sympathize with those they 
                                                 
9 Smith also writes that we sympathize with someone’s sentiments “when we have thus adopted them 
and made them our own” (TMS I.i.1.2). His language shows that to sympathize with someone is to 
“adopt” his or her sentiments. If the spectator cannot identify with the sentiments or actions of the person 
observed, then she cannot sympathize with them—even if she can imagine herself as the person observed 
in the situation at hand.  
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are closest to because agents have a better understanding of these actors and contexts so 
they use imagination to enter into their situation more easily (TMS I.i.4.10).10  It is more 
difficult for a spectator to sympathize with those she does not have a personal relationship 
with because the spectator cannot always accurately assess the context and what motivates 
their behavior. For instance, if I witness a friend of mine react angrily to a comment made 
by an acquaintance who has been continuously harassing her, I am likely to sympathize 
with her anger and her response. Someone observing who is unaware of the harassment 
and does not know that my friend is an even-tempered person may evaluate her behavior 
as inappropriate. I, on the other hand, have the necessary information to judge her behavior 
accurately. I don’t sympathize with her because she is my friend and I care for her.  Rather, I 
have enough information to properly interpret her behavior and judge impartially. 
  Smith views all persons as fundamentally similar in terms of psychology and basic 
human experience, but he recognizes that perceived differences between individuals or 
groups can obstruct sympathy. When a spectator observes an actor that she perceives as 
fundamentally different from herself, she won’t be able to imagine herself as that actor in 
the particular situation.11 This prevents her from making a connection with the actor and 
obstructs possible social relationships that may have grown from that connection.  
 Smith illustrates how failure to sympathize can lead to ill-treatment and oppression 
with the example of a slave-owner’s failure to sympathize with his slaves. He writes,   
                                                 
10 Griswold calls the spheres of people whom an actor most readily sympathizes with “circles of 
sympathy” (Griswold 1999, 77, 94, 192). These circles include family members, friends, and neighbors 
(TMS IV.ii.1.16; VI.2.i.2). 
11 Several contemporary theorists stress the importance of imagination for overcoming difference and 
facilitating equal respect among members of society. For example, Martha Nussbuam in From Disgust to 
Humanity says, “equality and equal respect cannot come into being, or long survive, without the ability to 
imagine the situation of a person in a different social group and assess it from that person’s point of 
view” (Nussbaum 2010, 47).  
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 There is not a negro from the coast of Africa who does not… possess a degree of 
 magnanimity which the soul of his sordid master is too often scarce capable of 
 conceiving. Fortune never exerted more cruelly her empire over mankind, than 
 when she subjected those nations of heroes to the refuse of the jails of Europe, to 
 wretches who possess the virtues neither of the countries which they come from, 
 nor of those which they go to, and whose levity, brutality, and baseness, so justly 
 expose them to the contempt of the vanquished (TMS V.2.9)  
 
 Smith condemns slavery and attributes the treatment of slaves to the inability of slave-
owners to recognize that slaves are similar to themselves. This failure prevents sympathy 
which can lead to ill treatment of others and give rise to oppressive relationships.12 Notice 
that Smith asserts that the contempt slaves hold for those who enslave them is justified. In 
doing so he claims that the slaves suffer from an injustice imposed on them by oppressive 
relationships. When spectators observe suffering that is unjustly inflicted on some by others 
their sympathy with the sufferer will result in disapproval for those who cause the harm 
(TMS II.i.2.5). In the case of slavery, custom produces perceived differences between 
spectators and those observed which obstructs the sympathy required for moral evaluation.  
 Smith appeals to education and conscience as a means of overcoming perceived 
differences advanced by “habit, custom and education” (WN I.ii.4). Through moral 
education, individuals can learn to evaluate and treat others properly by appealing to 
general moral rules as uniform standards for judgment and behavior. General rules are 
established over time as an agent identifies patterns in her own judgments and the 
judgments made by others (TMS III.4.7-8). Once the general rules are established, agents 
begin to act according to these moral principles rather than their sentiments, which allows 
agents to evaluate and treat others the same way—even those with whom they don’t easily 
sympathize. This becomes important for eliminating oppression.   
                                                 
12 Here I follow Weinstein (2006). 
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 Agents can also evaluate their own sentiments and behavior. By assessing whether 
external spectators will approve of their actions, agents come to judge their own behavior 
by imagining what an internal impartial spectator would think if aware of the motives 
behind the observable action. Smith explains,  
 When I endeavour to examine my own conduct, when I endeavour to pass 
 sentence upon it, and either to approve or condemn it, it is evident that, in all such 
 cases, I divide myself, as it were, into two persons; and that I, the examiner and 
 judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct 
 is examined into and judged of.  The first is the spectator, whose sentiments with 
 regard to my own conduct I endeavour to enter into, by placing myself in his 
 situation, and by considering how it would appear to me, when seen from that 
 particular point of view (TMS III.1.6).  
 
The impartial spectator constitutes conscience. Conscience, for Smith, must be disinterested 
and impartial in order for an agent to correctly evaluate her own behavior and guide proper 
action. One must use imagination to enter into the point of view of a spectator and 
“examine our own conduct as we imagine any other fair and impartial spectator would 
examine it” (TMS III.i.3).  
 Referencing David Hume’s mirror analogy, 13 Smith explains how individuals 
develop the ability to evaluate their own actions impartially. When an individual enters 
society,   
 …he is immediately provided with the mirror which…is placed in the countenance 
 and behavior of those he lives with, which always mark when they enter into, and 
 when they disapprove of his sentiments; and it is here that he first views the 
 propriety and impropriety of his own passions, the beauty and deformity of his 
 own  mind (TMS III.i.3).  
 
                                                 
13 In A Treatise of Human Nature Hume writes that “the minds of men are mirrors to one another, not only 
because they reflect each other’s emotions, but also because those rays of passions, sentiments and 
opinions may be often reverberated, and may decay away by insensible degrees” (Treatise 2.2.5.21).  
14 
 
Individuals in society are constantly engaged in actor-spectator relationships. As an actor, 
one observes how she is evaluated by others and holds herself accountable to their 
judgments, aiming to act in a way that warrants their approval (TMS III.i.3; I.i.5.3-4). She 
becomes capable of viewing herself as others view her and gains the ability to self-assess 
through imagination by becoming an impartial, well-informed spectator of her own 
conduct.  
 Smith observes that a person is “much more deeply interested in whatever 
immediately concerns himself than in what concerns any other man” (TMS II.ii.2.1). This 
natural propensity toward self-interest often corrupts moral judgment and obstructs moral 
action because individuals tend to favor their own interests when determining how to act.  
For this reason,  
 Before we can make any proper comparison of those opposite interests, we must 
 change our position. We must view them, neither from our own place nor yet from 
 his, neither with our own eyes nor yet with his, but from the place and with the 
 eyes of a third person, who has no particular connexion with either, and who judges 
 with impartiality between us (TMS III.3.3). 
 
In order to determine the appropriate way to act, individuals must, through imagination, 
distance themselves from their self-interested perspective and consider the interests of 
others. When an individual sets aside her partial view of the situation, she can apply “those 
general rules of conduct” which are “of great use in correcting the misrepresentations of 
self-love concerning what is fit and proper to be done in our particular situation” (TMS 
III.4.12).  
 
Impartiality and Moral Equality 
15 
 
 The importance that Smith places on impartiality in conscience and moral judgment 
reveals his commitment to moral equality.  Smith says that the purpose of adopting an 
impartial perspective is “to learn the real littleness of ourselves” (TMS II.3.4).14 Here, Smith 
means that through the impartial spectator, individuals can temper their self-interested 
sentiments and recognize that the interests of others are equal to their own. Moral equality 
here refers to the view that all human beings have equal moral worth, and so deserve equal 
consideration from others.  
 Indeed, for Smith, determining proper action requires that individuals give others 
equal consideration. Smith writes,  
 When we are always so much more deeply affected by whatever concerns 
 ourselves, than by whatever concerns other men…reason, principle, 
conscience…calls  to us, with a voice capable of astonishing the most presumptuous of 
our passions, that  we are but one of the multitude, in no respect better than any other in 
it (TMS III.3.4).  
 
By “multitude” Smith means the community of individuals, that we might now call the 
moral community. Stephen Darwall uses this language, arguing that, implicit in Smith’s 
“framework of judgments” is “a moral community among independent equal persons” 
(Darwall 2002, 132).  As equals in the moral community, Smith recognizes that individuals 
must hold one another mutually accountable. In a detailed footnote Smith writes,  
 A moral being is an accountable being…accountable being, as the word expresses, 
 is a being that must give an account of its actions to some other, and that 
 consequently must regulate them according to the good-liking of this other. Man 
 is accountable…to his fellow creatures…he must necessarily conceive himself as 
 accountable to his fellow creatures (TMS III.i.3[3]).15 
  
                                                 
14 Fleischacker notes that for Smith, “all people ought to be regarded as equal” and “the moral point of 
view requires us to see all human beings as equal” (Fleischacker 1999, 79). 
15 In this footnote Smith also argues that individuals are “principally accountable to God,” but that they 




This passage reveals that Smith recognizes each person as having equal standing as one 
among mutually accountable “moral beings.” A moral being, for Smith, seems to be an 
individual capable of conducting assessments of oneself and others through imagination 
and sympathy. Assuming an impartial perspective entails recognizing that everyone is “but 
one of the multitude” with equal moral standing.  
 The equal moral standing of individuals is based on their inherent moral worth.16 
Smith’s commitment to the equal standing of individuals based on their inherent worth is 
implicit in his theory of moral judgment17 and also prominently displayed in his discussion 
of justice and resentment. Smith’s account of moral judgment involves conferring a 
particular status to others by holding oneself accountable to them. His recognition of 
individuals’ authority signifies an underlying commitment to equal moral worth. When 
actors adjust their sentiments and conduct to “that pitch” which spectators can approve of 
they are recognizing the authority of others as spectators and judges.  
 Likewise, when agents deliberate about how to act morally, they assign authority to 
the viewpoints of spectators. Agents must consult the impartial spectator to determine what 
behavior is morally permissible. As seen, the impartial spectator is formed as individuals 
gain a sense of how others assess their sentiments and conduct through actor-spectator 
interactions. Smith insists that acting in a way that the impartial spectator will approve of 
requires that the agent consider the interests of others in her practical deliberations (TMS 
II.ii.2.1). Considering the interests of others is not a matter of mere utility or concern for 
preserving society.  According to Smith, “regard for the individual” does not “arise from 
                                                 
16 For further reading on equal dignity, or inherent worth, in Smith see Darwall (2002), especially pages 
132-133; and Rothschild (2001).  
17 Following Debes (forthcoming).  
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our regard for the multitude” or “concern for the general interest of society” (TMS II.ii.3.10). 
Rather, agents show concern for every individual “merely because he is our fellow-
creature” (TMS II.ii.3.10). Thus, contained within Smith’s account of moral judgment and 
conscience is a notion of the inherent value of individuals. 
 Smith’s commitment to equal standing based on moral worth is further 
demonstrated by his discussion of justice. According to Smith, the proper sentimental 
response to acts of injustice is resentment. Acts that warrant resentment are those that cause 
harm to individuals. To determine whether an act is just, the spectator must assess whether 
the receiver of the action is justified in feeling resentment toward the actor; that is to say, 
whether an impartial spectator would sympathize with the resentment. For example, recall 
Smith’s claim that slaves are justified in their contempt for those who oppress them. To 
declare that the slaves properly resent their owners is to adopt their resentment and 
disapprove of the slave-owners.  
 According to Smith, individuals correctly feel resentment toward those who 
disregard their status as equals. He writes, 
 What chiefly enrages us against the man who injures or insults us, is the little 
 account which he seems to make of us, the unreasonable preference which he gives 
to  himself above us, and that absurd self-love, by which he seems to imagine, that other 
 people may be sacrificed at any time, to his conveniency or his humour  (TMS 
 II.iii.1.5).  
 The resentment that arises when one treats another as inferior “is chiefly intent upon” 
making the offender realize that “the person whom he injured did not deserve to be treated 
in this manner” and aims “to bring him back to a more just sense of what is due to other 
people, to make him sensible of what he owes us” (TMS II.iii.1.5, my emphasis). This 
passage shows that, in holding others accountable for acts of injustice, individuals rightly 
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seek to be recognized and treated as equals—this is what is owed in virtue of their status as 
“fellow-creatures.”  
  As illustrated by his account of moral judgment and the previous example, Smith 
believes that individuals have equal moral worth, and thus ought to be respected by others. 
The term ‘respect,’ as Smith uses it, seems to denote an attitude of regard or reverence 
toward individuals or rules (TMS I.ii.4.2; I.iii.3.5; III.4.10-11). Smith sometimes uses ‘respect’ 
interchangeably with ‘esteem’ or ‘admiration’, but often uses ‘respect’ in conjunction with 
‘esteem’ or ‘admiration,’ suggesting a distinction between the two. Smith likens respect for 
individuals to respect for rules of justice and general rules of morality, “respect for you 
must always impose a very useful restraint upon their conduct; and respect for them may 
frequently impose no useless restraints upon your own” (TMS VI.ii.I.10). Like recognition 
of a rule, recognition of one’s equal standing among others imposes an attitude of regard 
that necessarily restrains one’s conduct.  
  Individuals can claim respect from others in virtue of their equal moral worth. 
Darwall terms this “recognition respect” (Darwall 2010, 108). Even though Smith often 
conflates respect and esteem, Darwall suggests contrasting recognition respect with 
appraisal respect, or moral esteem—the respect earned by merit of character and conduct. 
Darwall explains the distinction, 
 We can simultaneously believe that all persons are equally entitled to respect simply 
 by virtue of being persons and that whether a person deserves respect, and how 
much  respect he deserves, depends on how he conducts himself as a person (Darwall 
 2010,108 his emphasis).  
 
Individuals are entitled to, and thus can claim, equal respect based on recognition of their 
equal standing---individuals can earn moral esteem by virtue of character and conduct. Both 
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types of respect are found in Smith’s theory, as I will explain further below. Failure to 
recognize this distinction underlies common objections to viewing Smith as an egalitarian.  
 
Social Rank and Moral Esteem  
 Smith argues for equality of moral worth as a normative principle requiring that all 
individuals be regarded as equals, whereas social rank is just a matter of what members of 
society do, in fact, admire.18 Smith notes that there are better and worse—understood as 
more and less appealing—positions that one can hold in society. The higher ranked social 
positions are sought after because individuals naturally wish to receive sympathy from 
others in society and earn their praise. Smith observes that the desire to be praised and 
worthy of praise is inherent in human nature (TMS III.2.1).19 He explains that, “the love of 
praise is the desire of obtaining the favourable sentiments of our brethren. The love of 
praiseworthiness is the desire of rendering ourselves the proper objects of those 
sentiments” (TMS III.2.25). Praiseworthy behavior, whether or not praise is actually 
awarded, warrants moral esteem. And, Smith seems to think that a person’s social status 
ought to be based on his or her moral esteem. However, “upon coming into the world, we 
soon find that wisdom and virtue are by no means the sole objects of respect; nor vice and 
folly, of contempt” (TMS I.iii.3.2). While Smith thinks that virtue of character and conduct 
are the only praiseworthy objects, he observes that wealth and power are often awarded 
praise (TMS I.iii.3.2).  
                                                 
18 See Darwall (2010), especially page 110.  
19 Smith also says, “He desires, not only praise, but praiseworthiness; or to be that thing which, though it 
should be praised by nobody, is however, the natural and proper object of praise (TMS III.2.1).  
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 Smith explains that members of society tend to praise and admire the wealthy and 
powerful because “mankind are disposed to sympathize more entirely with our joy than 
with our sorrow…it is chiefly from this regard to the sentiments of mankind, that we 
pursue riches and avoid poverty” (TMS I.iii.2.1). According to Smith, what individuals are 
after in pursuing wealth is esteem. However, the ambitious often have a distorted sense of 
what it means to be praiseworthy and conflate praiseworthiness with actual praise. Smith 
observes that “wealth and greatness are often regarded with the respect20 and admiration 
which are due only to wisdom and virtue” and “contempt, of which vice and folly are the 
only proper objects, is often most unjustly bestowed upon poverty and weakness” (TMS 
I.iii.3.2).  
 For Smith, social hierarchy in a society does not represent a natural hierarchical 
order in which some are morally justified in treating others poorly; it is only natural in the 
sense that individuals are naturally “disposed to sympathize more entirely with our joy 
than with our sorrow” (TMS I.iii.2.1). Since the wealthy appear happier21 than those 
struggling with poverty, individuals more readily sympathize with the wealthy. Social 
status is a matter of mere social fact because it depends on what members of society as a 
matter of fact admire, not what they ought to admire.  
 Smith perceives this tendency toward admiring wealth as both beneficial to society 
and highly problematic. He acknowledges that admiring wealth has some beneficial 
                                                 
20 In this context Smith is using “respect” and “esteem” interchangeably. This is clear because he is 
discussing “respect and admiration” for “wisdom and virtue,” which must be earned by cultivating these 
traits.  
21 Smith says that “the rich man glories in his riches, because…mankind are disposed to go along with 




consequences, in that it promotes ambition, leading to progress that benefits everyone,22 but 
he also criticizes this tendency because it distorts the moral sentiments and causes people to 
falsely identify social status as indicative of moral worth (TMS I.iii.3.1). This impedes the 
ability of spectators to enter into an impartial perspective when evaluating, and 
determining proper action toward, those who occupy different social positions. This often 
results in unequal social relationships that empower some members of society to treat 
others unjustly, as revealed by attitudes toward the poor.  
 Smith observes that the poor are often wrongly perceived as naturally inferior, in 
terms of moral worth, to others in society and so do not receive equal recognition respect. 
For this reason, members of society are unable to sympathize with the poor. As a result, the 
poor23 are not equally capable of creating the social relationships necessary to participate in 
society and, thus, do not have the opportunity to earn moral esteem or improve their own 
condition (TMS I.iii.2.4).  Individuals falsely identify the wealthy as having a higher moral 
standing, worthy of sympathy and praise. Smith identifies this tendency as “the most 
universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments” because it prevents individuals 
from claiming recognition respect on the basis of their equal moral worth and holding one 
another accountable as equal members in the moral community.  
 Recall that relational egalitarians are concerned about unequal social conditions 
insofar as they facilitate relationships that empower some to oppress others. This concern 
drives Smith’s criticism of social hierarchy. He recognizes, though, that material inequality 
both stimulates and is a natural consequence of the commercial system that benefits all 
                                                 
22 For Smith, the desire for admiration can lead to ambition, which aids economic progress (TMS I.iii.3.1).  
23 This can be extended to other marginalized groups as well. See Weinstein (2006).  
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members of society. So rather than eliminate material inequalities, he advocates better 
education and a sort of economic sufficiency to encourage members of society to view one 
another as having equal value despite material differences.  Smith understands that social 
conditions often hinder the recognition of equal worth and proper moral esteem, and he 
seeks to create conditions which foster equality in matters that bear on social relationships 
and freedom for individuals. 
 
Smith’s Political View 
Equality as a Social Relationship 
 Smith is a relational egalitarian in that he does not regard inequality as such 
problematic. Rather, inequality is of moral concern insofar as it obstructs individuals’ equal 
standing, freedom, and opportunities. As noted, Smith endorses equality of moral worth as 
a normative principle. Importantly, Smith’s conception of moral equality does not assume 
that people are equal in virtue or intelligence, or entail that they be made equal in terms of 
wealth, rank, or material goods.  He thinks that by virtue of their equal moral worth, 
individuals deserve to stand in social relations that allow them to participate freely in 
society and the economy. In order to be capable of participating, individuals must be 
recognized and treated as moral equals who deserve equal consideration and respect.   
 It is clear that Smith views equality as a social relationship because he endorses 
market and political principles that enact equal respect and facilitate sympathy.24 For Smith, 
sympathy is the mechanism that enables social relationships. The inability to sympathize 
with others obstructs individual liberty and perpetuates oppression, as seen in Smith’s 
                                                 
24 See Muller (1993), Weinstein (2006), Darwall (2010)  
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extensive discussion of the poor and his reference to slavery. To enable sympathy among 
members of society that an agent doesn’t easily sympathize with, Smith advocates 
measures that aid equal recognition by ensuring that all members of society have enough in 
terms of material goods and resources25 to lead dignified lives. This way, individuals have 
the freedom to enter into trade agreements and have the ability to better their own 
condition.26 Smith’s commitment to equality as a social relationship can be seen in his 
efforts to eliminate socially constructed oppression. 
 
Eliminating Oppression 
 In designing a decent society,27 Smith seeks to eliminate oppression in order to 
secure conditions of freedom. As Rothschild explains, “Freedom, for Smith, is not being 
interfered with by others…Interference, or oppression, is itself an extraordinarily extensive 
notion; Smith at times talks of inequality as a form of oppression” (Rothschild 2001, 71).28 
Oppression, for Smith, consists of relationships among individuals in society in which the 
liberty of one is obstructed by another (Rothschild 2001, 27).  This might happen when 
some members of society are excluded from the economy or civil society because they are 
viewed as morally inferior, as is the case for slaves and, often, the poor.  This is why, 
according to Rothschild, Smith recognizes that “The most oppressive of all institutions…are 
the incorporations and communities of civil society” (Rothschild 2001, 33). Smith believes 
                                                 
25 By “resources,” I am referring to Smith’s strong support of public education and the other public 
services he argues should be made available to citizens by the state (WN V.i.f.54; WN V.i.f.55).  
26 Smith says that individuals naturally aspire to improve their own condition and better themselves 
(TMS I.iii.2.1).  
27 See Muller (1993) 63-164 
28 Here Rothschild is referring to Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence, pg 564 
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that the state must place some restrictions on citizens in order to promote conditions of 
freedom by ensuring justice for all individuals.  
  Smith claims that social and political inequalities are more a result of “custom, 
habit, and education” than actual intrinsic differences (WN I.ii.6). There are inherent human 
differences, but the implications of these differences are amplified by social practices and 
education. As Jack Russell Weinstein notes, “For Smith, non-physical, racial, gendered, 
class, and other differences are learned, not biologically determined” (Weinstein 2006, 102). 
Rather than stemming from fundamental disparities among individuals, oppression arises 
from custom and cultural diversity within a society. Smith writes,  
 …custom authorizes the widest departure from what is the natural propriety of 
 action…its influence is often much more destructive of good morals, and it is 
 capable of establishing, as lawful and blameless, particular action, which shock the 
 plainest principles of right and wrong (TMS V.2.1.6).  
Custom influences individuals’ moral judgment and hinders their ability to enter into an 
impartial perspective and sympathize with others through imagination. Smith uses slavery 
to demonstrate how custom can lead to oppression and cause injustice. Recall that Smith 
criticizes slave-owners for mistakenly perceiving their slaves as lesser moral beings than 
themselves. It is because the slave-owners are blinded by custom that they cannot 
sympathize with the slaves (TMS V.2.12). 
 Smith appeals to education as a means of overcoming oppression. Through 
education,29 individuals can learn about others and come to treat them with respect (TMS 
                                                 
29
 Smith explains that through education, individuals can be impartial in their moral reasoning even 
when impartiality does not come naturally, “the most vulgar education teaches us to act, upon all 
important occasions, with some sort of impartiality between ourselves and others… it is the most artificial 
and refined education only…which can correct the inequalities of our passive feelings (TMS III.3.7). He 
argues in WN that public education should be provided, and paid for by the public.(WN V.i.f.54). See also 
WN V.i.f.55.  
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III.3.7). Learning about others facilitates sympathy because it allows access to the 
experience of others through imagination—which is essential to sympathy. As noted, 
connecting with others through sympathy enables social relationships. Also, learning the 
general rules of morality is important for treating others equally when spectators find 
themselves unable to sympathize with another.30 Smith’s conception of justice also requires 
treating others equally; this will be addressed in more detail below.   
 Smith is concerned with removing the appearance of differences that are commonly 
perceived as morally important so that members of society can recognize the fact that they 
share a common basic standing. Smith thinks that standing in social relations of equality 
necessitates economic sufficiency. By economic sufficiency I mean that individuals must 
have enough in terms of economic assets to meet their physical needs for survival and to 
have a certain standing relative to other members of their society. Smith describes this in 
terms of “necessaries.” He writes,   
 By necessaries I understand, not only the commodities which are necessary for the 
 support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for 
 creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without. A linen shirt, for
 example, is not, strictly speaking, a necessary of life…But in present times…a 
 creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen 
 shirt,  the want of which would be supposed to denote the disgraceful degree of 
poverty  (WN, II.iv.11).   
Smith argues that because custom highly influences how members of society are viewed, 
custom must determine what resources are necessary in order for individuals to be 
respected within their society. Smith finds lacking material necessities degrading31 and 
asserts that it is morally demeaning for individuals to have to depend on the benevolence of 
                                                 
30 Smith says, “even in those cases in which sympathy does not actually take place…the general rules 
derived from our preceding experience of what our sentiments would commonly correspond with, 
correct upon this, as upon many other occasions, the impropriety of our present emotions “(TMS I.i.3.4 ).  




others to obtain the things needed for personal well-being. He endorses an institutional 
structure for distribution32 that yields economic sufficiency because he recognizes the poor 
as equal and equally deserving, not inferior to the well-off (WN, I.viii.36).33 Economic 
sufficiency is central to relational egalitarianism because it aids in the removal of 
oppression and in doing so, provides individuals with some of the means to their freedom.  
 
Securing Conditions of Freedom 
 Liberty, for Smith, is freedom from obstruction, both physical and those caused by 
injustice, and freedom for exchange and professional pursuits. Smith acknowledges that 
individuals need certain material goods and resources in order to exercise their rights and 
liberty.34 Liberty, for Smith, isn’t merely the absence of obstacles; as Darwall puts it, liberty 
“includes the intrinsically valuable relation of mutual respect” (Darwall 2002, 130). Here 
Darwall is referring to Smith’s argument that justice requires individuals to give equal 
consideration to the interests of others and conduct themselves accordingly (TMS II.ii.2.1-2). 
This is important for understanding Smith as a relational egalitarian. Further explicating 
Smith’s view, Darwall notes that for Smith, “In the free air of liberty and independency 
individuals relate to one another on equal terms, as having dignity as persons who may not 
                                                 
32 Smith endorses taxing luxury items that only the well-off in society can afford so that “the indolence 
and vanity of the rich is made to contribute in a very easy manner to relief of the poor” (WN V.i.d.5). He 
also argues that, “it is not very unreasonable that the rich should contribute to the publick expence, not 
only in proportion to their revenue, but something more than in proportion” (WN V.ii.e.6).  
33 See Fleischacker 2004, 207-208 
34 Weinstein points out that Smith’s system provides much of the inspiration for post-Rawlsian 
capabilities approaches to justice. See Weinstein, “Overlapping Consensus or Marketplace of Religions? 
Smith and Rawls” forthcoming.  
27 
 
be dealt with in the arbitrary and vexatious ways that would-be superiors typically 
presume” (Darwall 2002, 130).35   
 To be free, members of society must be recognized as equals—this is what allows 
them to engage in exchange and pursue professional and personal goals. And this requires 
more than non-interference from others. Smith relies on participation in a system of 
cooperative production, the market, and rules of justice to ensure conditions that facilitate 
mutual respect and social conditions of equality.  
 Smith sought to design a commercial society in which, as Jerry Muller puts it, every 
person “becomes a merchant rather than a slave, retainer, serf, or servant” because through 
such economic conditions “the relations of direct dependence upon a master which foster 
servile behavior are replaced by relations of greater personal freedom” (Muller 1993, 72).   
He argues that a nation’s revenue and stock must be continually growing36 in order for 
members of society to have enough to support themselves and improve their own condition 
(WN I.viii.36). Economic growth, coupled with just institutions in a “well-governed society” 
leads to conditions in which “all are abundantly supplied, and a workman, even of the 
lowest and poorest order…may enjoy a greater share of the necessaries and conveniences of 
life” (WN I.intro.4). Smith refers to conditions in which necessary and desirable goods are 
available to all members of society as “universal opulence” (WN I.i.10). He writes,  
 It is the great multiplication of the productions…in consequence of the division of 
 labour, which occasions, in a well-governed society, that universal opulence which 
 extends itself  to the lowest ranks of the people. Every workman has a great quantity 
                                                 
35 Rothschild further explains “Interference with the freedom to buy and to sell and to work is for Smith a 
form of political oppression…freedom of commerce in the Wealth of Nations, is an emancipation from 
personal, political, and sometimes physical oppression” (Rothschild 2001, 27).   
36 As Darwall notes, Smith is committed to the view that goals to increase economic efficiency may be 
pursued only to the extent that they are consistent with mutual respect for all persons as free and equal 
(Darwall 2001, 133). Also see  Rothschild (2001).  
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 of his own work to dispose of beyond what he himself has occasion for; and every 
 other workman being exactly in the same situation, he is enabled to exchange a great 
 quantity of his own goods for a great quantity…of theirs. He supplies them 
abundantly  with what they have occasion for, and they accommodate him as amply with 
what he  has occasion for, and a general plenty diffuses itself through all the different 
ranks of  the society (WN I.i.10). 
 
Smith’s commercial society is a system that creates social interdependence while 
simultaneously increasing personal freedom.37 He thinks that with economic growth made 
possible by the division of labor, members of society will have enough goods to trade with 
one another in order to obtain what they need and create relationships of mutual 
accountability through market exchange.  
 For Smith, the division of labor is the means by which goods can be most efficiently 
produced, which as he observes, will benefit all members of society. He stresses that the 
division of labor does not reflect a natural hierarchy of roles or abilities (WN V.f.50).  
Instead, the benefit that this arrangement yields for participants at all levels promotes social 
mobility and freedom to better one’s own condition. Smith is concerned that the division of 
labor might appear to represent a natural hierarchy that will lead to members of society 
viewing some as inferior to others based on their position. He also worries that dividing 
labor will inhibit personal growth for laborers who perform monotonous tasks, which may 
perpetuate the appearance of inferiority (WN V.i.f.50).  Smith advocates for public 
education as a means of facilitating personal edification for laborers and reducing the 
appearance of natural hierarchy (WN V.i.f.50-54). Much like in the case of social rank, Smith 
recognizes the efficacy of certain arrangements that may promote oppressive relationships 
                                                 
37 See Muller (1993) 63-76  
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and stresses the importance of both informal moral learning and formal education to ensure 
that such conditions do not become oppressive.  
 The division of labor allows individuals to use their natural talents and abilities to 
participate in a system of cooperative production. Individuals participating at all levels 
ought to be appreciated for their role. Smith thinks that all workers should be appropriately 
compensated and have enough to appear in public without shame, but also endorses 
patterns of distribution and public services to ensure economic sufficiency (WN I.viii.36, 
V.i.c.iii.1-2). Smith writes, “It is but equity…that they who feed, clothe, and lodge the whole 
body of the people, should have such a share of the produce of their own labour as to be 
themselves tolerably well fed, clothed, and lodged” (WN I.viii.36). This allows them to 
enter into trade agreements that demonstrate equal respect through mutual accountability 
(Darwall 2010, 110). Holding one another accountable in trade agreements facilitates 
sympathy, and by extension equality, by allowing individuals to engage and sympathize 
with those members of society who are not close in proximity.  
 In addition to economic sufficiency and economic participation that facilitates social 
relationships, liberty requires justice. Smith observes that relationships of “authority and 
subordination” give rise to government, which ought to benefit all members of society (WN 
V.i.b). Smith asserts that an important duty of the state is “that of protecting, as far as 
possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other 
member in it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice” (WN V.i.b.1). 
Justice serves to protect individuals from harm; “the violation of justice is injury: it does 
real and positive hurt to some particular persons, from motives which are naturally 
disapproved of” (TMS II.ii.1.5). Smith says that justice encompasses “everything which his 
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equals can with propriety force him to do, or which they can punish for not doing” (TMS 
II.ii.1.10).  
 As discussed, the harm that Smith is concerned with isn’t just physical harm or 
destruction of property, but the harmful treatment that results from placing one’s interests 
above the interests of others.38 Smith writes, “When we prefer ourselves so shamefully and 
so blindly to others, we become the proper objects of resentment” (TMS III.3.4). Smith 
describes resentment as the appropriate sentimental response to acts of injustice.  He says 
that a “violation of justice” is whatever act is “the proper object of resentment” (TMS 
II.ii.1.5).39 This statement suggests that viewing others as inferior to oneself constitutes an 
act of injustice. Consider the passage examined above:  
 What chiefly enrages us against the man who injures or insults us, is the little 
 account which he seems to make of us, the unreasonable preference which he gives 
 to himself above us, and that absurd self-love, by which he seems to imagine, that 
 other people may be sacrificed at any time, to his conveniency or his humour (TMS 
 II.iii.1.5). 
The unjust harm depicted in this passage consists in treating the victim as less worthy than 
the agent. And, according to Smith, the rules of justice arise from “the general fellow-feeling 
which we have with every man merely because he is our fellow-creature” (TMS II.ii.3.10) 
and are meant to “correct the otherwise natural inequality of our sentiments” when a 
person’s “sense of propriety” cannot (TMS III.3.3).  Thus, rules of justice are meant to 
protect individuals from harm, including unfair treatment and oppression.  
                                                 
38 See Fleischacker (2004), 72-79.  
39 Smith also says, “Resentment…is the safeguard of justice and the security of innocence” (TMS II.ii.1.4). 




 Smith asserts that the state must ensure justice and protect individuals against harm 
in order to secure individual liberty, so that citizens can function equally in society.  He 
writes,  
 To hurt in any degree the interest of any one order of citizenship for no other 
 purpose but to promote that of some other, is evidently contrary to that justice 
 and  equality of treatment which the sovereign owes to all the different orders of 
his  subjects (WN IV.viii.30).  
 
The rules of justice express equality for all members of society. By attributing this role to the 
state Smith is “instating a legal framework that expresses equality of all citizens” 
(Fleischacker 2004, 74).  
 Smith contrasts justice with benevolence. Whereas duties of justice are generally 
negative duties not to do harm, duties of benevolence require acts of “friendship, charity, or 
generosity” (TMS II.ii.1.5). Initially, Smith says that “even the most ordinary degree of 
kindness or beneficence, cannot, among equals, be extorted by force” (TMS II.ii.1.7). Here 
Smith says that we cannot compel acts of benevolence from one another.  This is because 
while acts of justice are required, but acts of benevolence are simply worthy of moral 
esteem.  However, he says in the very next paragraph that the state may enforce duties of 
benevolence,  
 A superior may, indeed, sometimes with universal approbation, oblige those under 
 his jurisdiction to behave in this respect, with a certain degree of propriety to one 
 another.  The laws of all civilized nations oblige parents to maintain their children, 
 and children to maintain their parents, and impose upon men many other duties 
 of beneficence. The civil magistrate is entrusted with the power not only of 
 preserving the public peace by restraining injustice, but of promoting the 
 prosperity of the commonwealth…he may prescribe rules, therefore, which not 
 only  prohibit mutual injuries among fellow-citizens, but common mutual good 




Smith is sometimes interpreted as inconsistent because his statements concerning the 
enforceability of acts of benevolence appear in tension with one another.40 However, it 
seems that in this excerpt when Smith says that “duties of beneficence” can be imposed he 
means that the state can enforce duties that are commonly perceived as acts of benevolence, 
because in some cases such acts are more properly understood as acts of justice.  According 
to Smith’s definition, if performing or failure to perform an act causes harm, then it is an act 
of justice and not benevolence.  
 It seems that Smith conceives of justice as a concise set of rules that govern society 
and protect individuals from harm, but also recognizes that a just society may require more 
than constraints on behavior.  Refraining from harm may not consist simply in lack of 
harmful actions, but in fair and equal treatment.  Smith understands that enforcing acts that 
are generally viewed as acts of benevolence is a delicate task that could threaten “liberty, 
security, and justice” but warns that failure to enforce them “exposes the commonwealth to 
many gross disorders and shocking enormities” (TMS II.ii.1.8).  It is because of the delicacy 
of enforcing such duties that Smith assigns it to just institutions rather than individuals.  
 
IV.  Challenges to Interpreting Smith as a Relational Egalitarian 
 In this section I consider possible objections to the relational egalitarian 
interpretation that I’ve proposed. Critics of an egalitarian reading often point to particular 
passages in Smith’s work that appear to support inequality in society. I argue that these 
passages cease to conflict with an egalitarian reading once we establish that Smith is not 
concerned with equality as such, but with relational equality.  
                                                 
40 See Fleischacker (2004) 148-152.  
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Hierarchy: Social Rank and the Division of Labor 
 Smith offers an account of social rank which seems to suggest that he believes 
human beings are naturally disposed to form hierarchical groups. At times it seems that 
Smith supports hierarchical social arrangements. For instance, Smith says “upon this 
disposition of mankind to go along with all the passions of the rich and powerful, is 
founded the distinction of ranks, and the order of society” (TMS I.iii.2.3). By claiming that 
the “order of society” rests upon social hierarchy Smith appears to favor such unequal 
arrangements.  
 This aspect of Smith’s work presents the most powerful objection to the egalitarian 
interpretation I’m offering. However, it seems that Smith’s commitment to social hierarchy 
is often misunderstood. Smith prioritizes the well-being of individuals in society over 
society as a whole (TMS II.ii.3.10).  And, while Smith doesn’t argue that all social 
inequalities ought to be eliminated, he is concerned with eradicating the relationships of 
oppression and domination which often stem from social hierarchy. In particular, Smith 
stresses the importance of the equal administration of justice by the sovereign (WN 
IV.viii.30). He also proposes that apprenticeship requirements be abolished and a system of 
public education be implemented, which he believes will allow the poor to improve their 
social conditions (WN I.x.c.1-6). Because the “master” of any profession can only have one 
apprentice at a time, and many professions require an apprenticeship, careers are not open 
to talents and very few are able to access the necessary education to compete professionally 
(WN I.x.c.5). Smith also calls for tax policies in which “the indolence and vanity of the rich 
is made to contribute in a very easy manner to the relief of the poor” (WN V.i.d.5).  
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 Furthermore, recall that Smith recognizes that social rank and the division of labor 
may lead to oppressive relationships but is concerned with avoiding such an outcome while 
preserving the utility of these social arrangements. Smith criticizes the wealthy and 
powerful and the tendency of members of society to admire them. Rather than trying to 
prevent individuals from admiring wealth, Smith argues that individuals ought to 
recognize that wealth does not make one superior in terms of moral worth to another, or 
give license to dominate another. He endorses a commercial system that will foster 
universal opulence and a fair distribution of wealth so that individuals who are worse off 
can be recognized as having moral standing equal to other members of society. Smith 
doesn’t view social rank or the division of labor as inherently oppressive; instead of 
abandoning these arrangements that are useful for the economic growth that benefits all 
members of society Smith seeks to foster conditions that allow for freedom and equal 
respect within these systems.  
 
Natural Differences 
 Smith famously proclaims that “the differences between the most dissimilar 
characters, between a philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise 
not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education” (WN I.ii.4). Fleischacker, 
and others who interpret Smith as an egalitarian, rely heavily on this passage to support the 
claim that Smith views all individuals as equal in terms of abilities and talents until they are 
integrated into society (Fleischacker 2004, 75-77).  This claim invites criticism from Raphael 
35 
 
and other critics of an egalitarian interpretation.41 Raphael takes this to mean that, in order 
to be an egalitarian one must deny differences in natural endowments among individuals. 
He responds by arguing that Smith “does not espouse egalitarianism proper” because he 
acknowledges natural differences among individuals. Raphael says,  
 [Smith] undoubtedly thinks that social distinctions do not reflect natural, innate, 
 differences of potential talent, but he does not deny the existence of natural
 differences.  In his remarks about the philosopher and the porter, he goes on to say 
 that in their infancy the two were ‘perhaps very much alike’, so that parents and 
 playfellows could not perceive ‘any remarkable difference’ (Raphael 2007, 123).  
 
Raphael is correct to point out that Smith does not perceive individuals as originally 
identical; but recognizing that there are natural differences between individuals does not 
conflict with a relational egalitarian view. Recall Anderson’s view of individuals as “equal 
in all of their diversity” (Anderson 1999, 308).  
 Smith’s purpose in comparing the philosopher and the porter is to show how natural 
differences can become more prominent over time and are perpetuated by education and 
custom. Smith recognizes that individuals are not identical in terms of abilities and talents, 
but observes that differences in circumstances pervasively influence the developments of 
talents and abilities, making the appearance of natural differences much more pronounced 
than they actually are. In particular, social circumstances make it difficult for some 
individuals to develop their abilities, which promotes the appearance that those who 
belong to a lower social order are less talented, intelligent, and have lesser capacities for 
virtue. By comparing a philosopher to a street porter, Smith calls attention to how social 
standing contributes to this perception of the poor. But his conclusion isn’t that differences 
                                                 
41 See Jeffrey T. Young and Barry Gordon (1997).  
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between individuals are absent, just that “the difference of natural talents in different men 
is, in reality, much less than we are aware of” (WN I.ii.4).  
 Rather than denying them, Smith regards differences in talents and abilities as useful 
because they allow for an interdependent division of labor. Smith explains that, as 
individuals enter professions:    
  The difference of talents comes then to be taken notice of, and widens by degrees, 
 till at least the vanity of the philosopher is willing to acknowledge scarce any 
 resemblance.  But without the disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, every 
 man must have procured to himself every necessary and conveniency of life which 
 he wanted. All must have had the same duties to perform, and the same work to 
 do, and there could have been no such difference of employment as could alone 
 give occasion to any great difference of talents. As it is this disposition which forms 
 that difference of talents, so remarkable among men of different professions, so it is 
 this same disposition which renders that difference useful (WN I.ii.4-5).  
  
Smith embraces differences in talent, but warns that such differences should not be taken to 
indicate moral worth. As discussed, Smith stresses the importance of education to ensure 
that natural differences don’t foster relationships of oppression and domination. This is 
consistent with a relational egalitarian interpretation of Smith.  
 Raphael also objects to the claim that Smith views individuals as equal in terms of 
moral worth, citing the following passage:  
 That there is a world to come, where exact justice will be done to every man, where 
 every man will be ranked with those who, in the moral and intellectual 
 qualities, are  really his equals; where the owner of those humble talents and virtues 
which, from  being depressed by fortune, had, in this life, no opportunity of displaying 
 themselves…will be placed upon a level, and sometimes above those  who, in this 
 world, had enjoyed the highest reputation…is a doctrine…that the virtuous man 
who  has the misfortune to doubt of it, cannot possibly avoid wishing…to believe it (TMS 




Raphael takes Smith to be claiming that individuals are not equal in terms of moral worth.  
But this passage actually contains a descriptive claim that does not conflict with moral 
egalitarianism.  
 Smith explains that at a fundamental level all individuals desire to receive and be 
proper objects of praise and approval from others (TMS III.2.1). Often in society the virtue 
that renders an individual the proper object of praise is not recognized by others and praise 
is not awarded. Praise is frequently given to those who do not deserve it, like the wealthy 
and powerful. Because this is the case, Smith observes that members of society often hope 
that there will be an afterlife in which their praiseworthiness will be recognized and they 
will be ranked among their equals in terms of virtue, not moral worth. The above passage is 
a description of this “life to come” (TMS III.2.33). According to Smith, this belief is often 
what encourages individuals to cultivate a virtuous character even when praise is withheld.  
 Even if we were to take the above passage as containing the claim that Raphael 
attributes to it, the wording does not suggest moral inequality if we apply the distinction 
between moral worth and moral esteem. Smith says that “every man will be ranked with 
those who, in moral and intellectual qualities, are really his equals; where the owner of those 
humble talents and virtues which, from being depressed by fortune, had, in this life, no 
opportunity of displaying themselves” (TMS III.2.33).  This implies that individuals will be 
ranked in terms of their moral estimability rather than other arbitrary features that tend to 
be praised by members of society. Smith recognizes that circumstances and fortune, as a 
matter of fact, have a significant influence on how individuals are perceived by others; he 





The Purpose of Civil Government 
 
 Critics may also point to passages in which Smith’s account of the foundation and 
purposes of civil government appear inegalitarian. In particular, Smith famously writes,  
  Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality 
 instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some 
 property against those who have none at all (WN V.i.b.12).  
 
This may seem to suggest that Smith prioritizes the interests of the wealthy and powerful 
over the impoverished members of society. However, considering this passage in context 
rather than in isolation suggests otherwise. The purpose of the section that contains this 
passage is to discuss the proper role of the sovereign in administering justice. Which, as 
quoted previously, Smith describes as “that of protecting, as far as possible, every member 
of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of 
establishing an exact administration of justice” (WN V.i.b.1).  
 Smith defends his endorsement of an equal and fair system of justice by giving a 
historical account of how civil government came to be. He explains that the need for 
government emerged in order to protect property (WN V.i.b.12). “Inequality of fortune” led 
to relationships of “authority and subordination” which laid the groundwork for the 
models of civil government that Smith criticizes. It is in this context of providing a history 
of unjust government that the above passage appears.  
 After explaining that civil government arose in the “second period of society” as a 
means for the rich to protect their property, Smith argues that this arrangement led to 
“several very gross abuses” (WN V.i.b.14). For instance, the sovereign was not held 
accountable and justice was wrongly employed as a source of revenue, leading to unfair 
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practices. Smith admonishes these systems of government, asserting that the executive 
branch of the sovereign must be separate from the judicial and rules of justice ought to be 
applied equally across society. Smith says,  
 …upon the impartial administration of justice depends the liberty of every 
 individual, the sense which he has of his own security.  In order to make every 
 individual feel himself perfectly secure in the possession of every right which 
 belongs to him, it is not only necessary that the judicial should be separated from 
 the executive power, but that it should be rendered as much as possible 
 independent  of that power (WN V.i.b.25).  
 
Smith’s clear endorsement of the equal administration of justice shows that leveraging the 
above, often misused, passage as an objection to my view would be misguided.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 I have shown that Smith is committed to moral equality and argued that this 
commitment provides the foundation for his theory of political economy. Using Anderson’s 
democratic equality as a model I have argued that Smith’s political theory is best 
interpreted as a kind of relational egalitarianism. Like Anderson, Smith aims to design a 
decent society in which institutions provide individuals with a certain kind of freedom and 
relational equality. At the core of Smith’s political view is justice and liberty. As shown, this 
means that individuals must be able to participate in society without being oppressed or 
identified as less worthy of respect based on social status, material goods, or morally 
irrelevant natural endowments and that they must be able to hold one another mutually 
accountable. Freedom from oppression and social conditions of freedom are at the heart of 
relational equality, and I have shown that Smith’s fundamental commitment to these 
principles make him a relational egalitarian. Importantly, this interpretation of Smith 
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explains how the material inequality and social hierarchy that Smith allows are consistent 
with an egalitarian political theory. As such, my proposed interpretation alleviates 











Altman, Andrew & Wellman, Christopher Heath. (2009) A Liberal Theory of International 
 Justice, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.  
Anderson, Elizabeth. (1999) “What’s the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109: 287-337 University 
 of Chicago Press.  
---------- (2009) “Democracy: Instrumental vs. Non-Instrumental Value” in Contemporary 
 Debates in Political Philosophy. Eds. Thomas Christiano and John Christman. West 
 Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing.  
Arneson, Richard, "Egalitarianism," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 
 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) 
 <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/egalitarianism/>. 
Darwall, Stephen. (2010) “Smith’s Ambivalence about Honour,” The Adam Smith Review 5: 
 106-123 The International Adam Smith Society.  
---------(2004) “Equal Dignity in Adam Smith,” The Adam Smith Review 1: 129-134 The 
 International Adam Smith Society.  
--------- (1999) “Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith,” Philosophy &  Public 
 Affairs 28: 139-164 Blackwell Publishing.  
Debes, Remy. (Forthcoming) “Adam Smith on Dignity and Equality,” The British Journal for 
 the History of Philosophy Routledge Publishing.  
41 
 
Evensky, Jerry. (2005) Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy: A Historical and Contemporary 
 Perspective on Markets, Law, Ethics, and Culture, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
 University Press 
Fleischacker, Samuel. (2004) On Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, Princeton, NJ: 
 Princeton University Press.  
Frankfurt, Harry. (1987) “Equality as a Moral Ideal,” Ethics 98: 21-43 University of Chicago 
 Press. 
Griswold, Charles L. (1999) Adam Smith and the Virtues of the Enlightenment, Cambridge, 
 UK: Cambridge University Press.  
Haakonssen, Knud. (1988). Traditions of Liberalism, Canberra, AU: The Centre for 
 Independent Studies. 
Hume, David. (2000) A Treatise of Human Nature, David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton 
 (eds.) New York, NY: Oxford University Press.  
Muller, Jerry. (1993) Adam Smith in His Time and Ours: Designing the Decent Society. New 
 York, NY: The Free Press.  
Nussbaum, Martha. (2010) From Disgust to Humanity. New York, NY: Oxford University 
 Press.  
Pogge, Thomas. (2010) “A Critique of the Capability Approach” in Measuring Justice: 
 Primary Goods and Capabilities. Eds. Harry Brighthouse and Ingrid Robeyns. New 
 York, NY: Cambridge University Press.  
Raphael, D.D. (2007) The Impartial Spectator: Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy, New York, 
 NY: Oxford University Press.  
Rothschild, Emma. (2001) Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorecet, and the 
 Enlightenment, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
Sen, Amaryta. (1992) Inequality Reexamined, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
Smith, Adam. (1976) The Theory of Moral Sentiments, D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie (eds.) 
 Oxford: Clarendon Press: Liberty Press.   
-------- (1976) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, R.H. 
 Campbell and A.S. Skinner (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Weinstein, Jack. (2006) “Sympathy, Difference, and Education: Social Unity in the Work 
 of Adam Smith,” Philosophy and Economics 22:79-111 Cambridge University Press.  
--------- (forthcoming: June 2012) “Overlapping Consensus or Marketplace of Religions? 
Smith  and Rawls” Philosophia.  
Winch, Donald. (1988) “Adam Smith and the Liberal Tradition” in Traditions of 
 Liberalism, ed. Knud Haakonssen. Canberra, AU: The Centre for Independent 
 Studies.   
Young, Jeffery T. (1997) Economics as a Moral Science: the Political Economy of Adam  Smith, 
Lyme, NH: Edward Elgar Publishing.  
 
42 
 
 
 
